An analytic formulation and evaluation of the existing structure of legal reserve requirements of the Greek economy: An uncommon case. Economic Papers No. 33, June 1984. II/253/84-EN by Demopoulos, George
BCN IC
hPBRS
coMMtsstoN 0F THE EUn0pEAil coMMlt{$TtES o DTBECT0BATE-GEItERAI FoB EC0I{0Mlc  All0 FlilAilClAl AFFAInS
No. 33 June 1984
An Analyt'ic Formul ation and Eval uation
of the Existing Structure of Legal
Reserve Requirements of the Greek
Economy : An Uncommon Case
George D. Dernopoul os
Internal PaPer"Economic Papers" are written by the Staff of the Directorate-GeneraL
for Economic and FinanciaL Affairs, or by experts working in association
with them. The "Papers" are intended to increase ah,areness of the
technicaI work being done by the staff and to seek comments  and
suggestions for further anatyses. They may not be quoted without
authorisation. Views expressed represent excLusiveIy the positions
of the author and do not necessari ty correspond with those of the
Commission of the European Communities. Comments  and enquiries
shoutd be addressed to
The Directorate-GeneraL for Economic and FinanciaL Affairs,
[Commission of the European Communities,
200, rue de La Loi
1049 Brussets, Betgium
{~'  ECONOMIC  PAPERS  /!Jv 
No.  33  June  1984 
~An  Analytic  Formulation  and  Evaluation 
of  the  Existing  Structure of  Legal 
Reserve  Requirements  of  the  Greek 
Economy  :  An  Uncommon  Case 
-----
George  D.  Demopoulos  ..... 
Internal  Paper 
Professor of  Economics,  The  Athens  Graduate  School  of  Economics  and  Business 
Sciences  (on  leave),  and  Economic  Adviser,  Commission  of the  European  Commu-
nities, Directorate General  for  Economic  and  Financial  Affairs,  Brussels. 
The  author  is  indebted  to  Professors  Karl  Brunner,  Allan  H.  Meltzer,  Michele 
Fratianni,  Stephen  M.  Miller and  an  anonymous  referee for critical  comments 
on  an  earlier draft and  Professor  Nicos  Yannacopoulos  and  Dr.  George  Kasmas 
of the  Economic  Research  Department  of the  Bank  of Greece  for  the  lengthy 
discussions  during  the  preparation  of this work. 
II/253/84-EN  This  paper  only  exists in  English 
I, d.., 'f - i  -
ABSTRACT 
This  paper  provides  a qualitative evidence  concerning  the  effec-
tiveness of the  existing institutional  arrangements  pertaining  to  the 
differential  reserve  requirements  on  banks'  liabilities and  assets of the 
Greek  economy  in  achieving  the  desired objectives of economic  development 
and  stabilization.  The  innovative  feature of the  paper  is that it 
systematically  incorporates  into an  operating  framework  the  country's 
institutional  arrangements  bearing  on  reserve  requirements. 
The  analysis  shows  that the  maintained  categories  of reserve 
requirements  and  the mechanism  of allowing  banks  to withdraw  from  the 
central  bank  part of  their reserves  to cover  credit to different sectors 
of  the  economy,  produce  such  a  complex  system  of required  reserves  that 
it mkkes  it more  difficult for  the  central  bank  to  keep  full  control 
over  the· aggregate  volume  and  direction of  bank  credit.  In  addition, 
the  credit policy on  secondary  reserve  requirements  presents obvious 
weaknesses,  since  banks  can  evade  their primary  objective through 
other means  of borrowing. - ii -
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Regulations  over  the  availability of banks'  liabilities and  assets 
as  a means  of controlling the  overall  economic  activity are  a  feature  to 
be  found  in  developed  and  developing  countries.  In  many  countries, mone-
tary authorities also  attempt  to  control  the  distribution of available 
credit between  the  private and  the  public  sector,  reallocate credit to 
sectors of 
11national  priority
11  and  prohibit  the  allocation of credit to 
non  productive  activities.  To  this end,  monetary  authorities employ  a 
variety of  policy  instruments,  ranging  from  those  of differential  reserve 
requirements  on  banks'  liabilities and  assets  to  fixing  of interest rates 
paid  on  bank  credit and  deposits  and  credit ceilings.  However,  the  economic 
implications  associated with  the  variety of  these  policy  instruments  and 
the  effectiveness  thereof for the  stabilization and  economic  development 
objectives are  seriously disputed  1.  The  problem  is particularly acute 
when  one  analyses  a  complex  system  of quantitative controls  on  the  out-
standing  amount  of  specific types  of  bank  credit. 
With  specific reference  to  Greece,  the  research  endeavours  that 
take  some  good  account  of the  problems  mentioned  above  are  those  by 
Avramides  (1972),  Kasmas  (1972)  and,  very  recently,  Halikias  (1979).  None-
theless,  these  studies  by-pass,  among  other things,  the  question  of 
differential  reserve  requirements  on  banks'  liabilities and  assets as  an 
instrument of allocating  bank  credit to different sectors of the  economy. 
Hence,  the  objective of this paper  is to  shed  light on  certain aspects  of 
the  Greek  monetary  system  which  have  been  left out  in  these  three  studies, 
and  particularly to  provide  a  qualitative evidence  concerning  the 
effectiveness of the  existing institutional  arrangements  pertaining  to  the 
differential  reserve  requirements  on  banks'  liabilities and  assets of  the 
Greek  economy  in  achieving  the  desired  objectives of economic  development 
and  stabilization 2 
1  See  particularly the  survey  article  by  Silber  (1973). 
2 For  a detailed analytic presentation  of  the  structure and  functioning 
of  Greece's  financial  system,  see,  Demopoulos  (1981)  and  (1983).  Some 
very  good  account  on  the  question  on  the  efficacy of selective credit 
controls to stimulate  gross  fixed  investment  is given  by  Bitros  (1981) · - 2  -
The  innovative  feature  of  the  paper  is that it systematically in-
corporates  into an  operating  framework  the  country's  institutional  arrange-
ments  bearing  on  reserve  requirements.  This  chosen  framework  allows  for  an 
evaluation  of the  existing institutional  arrangements  of the  required 
reserve  system  and  its effectiveness  in  bringing  about  the  deliberate 
shifts in  real  resource  utilization and  hence  in  part the  effectivenss of 
the  Greek  monetary  policy.  It helps  to  understand  how  monetary  authorities 
and  government  officials affect the  behavior  of the  banking  system  when 
they manipulate  policy variables; it thus  brings  about  numerous  implica-
tions which  enhance  in  part the  comprehension  of the  Greek  monetaty  system. 
It also yields  an  analytic structure for a  useful  series of follow-up 
studies exploring  the  relevent empirical  patterns. 
The  qualitative results obtained  are  quite explicit.  The  structure 
of controls maintained  by  the monetary  authorities on  banks'  liabilities 
and  assets,  the  maintained  categories of reserve  requirements  and  the 
mechanism  of allowing  banks  to withdraw  from  the  central  bank  part ~f 
their reserves  to  cover  credit to different sectors of  the  economy, 
produce  such  a complex  system  of required  reserves  that it makes  it 
more  difficult for  the  central  bank  to  keep  full  control  over  the 
aggregate  volume  and  direction of  bank  credit.  In  addition,  the  evidence 
shows  that the  existing  legislation pertaining  to  secondary  reserve 
requirements  RR2  is accompanied  by  negative  allocative effects and 
regulates  bank  credit inefficiently.  First, it is often  possible for 
banks  to  switch  the  primary  objective of  RR2  ;  secondly,  they  can 
offset almost  all  the  remaining  power  of  RR2  through  other means  of 
borrowing.  Consequently,  the  reallocation of credit to  sectors of 
.. national  priority  ..  may  not  be  best  accomplished  through  the  RR2 
policy. 
Section  II  presents  a  general  discursive elaboration of the  nature 
of  the  institutional  arrangements  bearing  on  reserve  requirements  on  which 
their analytic formulation  and  evaluation  is based.  Section  III' proceeds 
with  the  analytic formulation  of the  institutional  arrangements  of the 
required  reserve  system  and  sets  up  an  innovative  framework  which  allows 
for  an  evaluation of the  existing structure of required  reserves  and  their 
complexity. Section  IV  ~resents an  evaluation  of  the  system  and  its com-
plexity.  Section  V summarizes  the  main  conclusions  of  the  paper. - 3  -
2.  THE  INSTITUTIONAL  ARRANGEMENTS  OF  THE  REQUIRED  RESERVE  SYSTEM 
The  Greek  authorities,  in  their effort to  achieve  the  stabilisa-
tion and  economic  development  objectives,  have  heavily  relied on  monetary 
policy as  a means  of demand  mangement  as  well  as  influencing  the  alloca-
tion of credit to various  sectors of the  economy.  To  these  ends,  a  new 
complex  of  quantitative controls was  introduced  in  1966  on  the  outstanding 
amount  of  specific types  of  banks•  credit.  The  various  controls currently 
in  force  are  aiming  at :  the  efficient distribution of available credit 
between  the  private and  the  public  sector;  the  reallocation of credit 
to  sectors of unational  priority
11
;  and  the  prohibition of allocating 
credit to  nonproductive  activities.  The  main  instruments  introduced  by  the 
monetary  authorities to  efficiently allocate  bank  credit are  :  differen-
tial  reserve  requirements  on  banks•  liabilities and  assets, fixing  of 
interest rates paid  on  bank  credit and  deposits,  and  credit ceilings. 
In  this section,  we  introduce, first, a  general  elaboration of 
the  nature  of  the  arrangements  on  reserve  requirements  and  then  proceed 
with  an  analytical  formulation  and  evaluation  of reserve  requirements. 
2.1.  The  nature  of the  arrangements  on  reserve  requirements 
There  are  two  major  categories of  reserve  requirements  referred  to 
as  primary  and  secondary. 
1.  Under  primary  re-serve  requirements,  banks  are  requ.i red  to 
deposit with  the  Bank  of Greece  a  percentage  of  their private 
deposit  liabilities and  of certain types  of credit extended  by  them. 
In  the  case  of  banks•  private deposit liabilities, we  distinguish 
the  following  categories of reserve  requirements  3  : 
3The  required  reserve  ratios also  differentiated with  respect to the 
size of the  banks  (large  and  small  banks).  For  expositional  clarity, 
we  do  not  draw  this distinction  in  this paper. - 4 -
Since  1972,  banks  have  been  required  to  d~posit with  the  Bank  of 
Greece  a  percentage  of their private savings,  private  demand  and  restricted 
deposits  as  non-interest  bearing  primary  reserves;  reserve  requirements 
have  also  been  extended  on  private  savings  deposits  (excluding  savings 
deposits  on  3-month  notice),  private  time  and  private  demand  and  restricted 
deposits  respectively as  interest-bearing primary  reserves;  also,  reserve 
requirements  are  imposed  periodically on  private  savings  and  private demand 
deposits  as  interest-bearing seasonal  primary  reserves. 
In  the  case  of credit extended  by  banks,  we  distinguish the 
following  categories of reserve  requirements  : 
Banks  are  required  to  deposit with  the  Bank  of  Greece  a  percentage 
of their short-term credit extended  to  industry and  to domestic  and  import 
trades  respectively as  non-interest-bearing primary  reserves,  while  they 
are  allowed  to withdraw  from  the  Bank  of  Greece  part of their reserves  to 
cover  credit to  export  and  tobacco  trades  and  shipbuilding,  to  medium 
and  long-term  credit for  investment  in  plant  and  equipment  and  to  public 
enterprises. 
2.  Secondary  reserve  requirements  relate to  the  compulsory  investment 
in  Treasury  bills, government  bonds  and  bonds  of public enterprises as  well 
as  to a  percentage  of  banks'  private deposit  liabilities on  certain types 
of  bank  credit.  Analytically  : 
Banks  are  required  to  invest a  percentage  of their private demand, 
savings  and  restricted deposits  respectively as  well  as  a  percentage  of 
their private  time  and  3-month  notice  savings  in  interest-bearing Treasury 
bills as  secondary  reserves;  they  are  also  required  to  extend  a  percentage 
of  their total  private deposits  as  medium  and  long-term  credit to  industry 
and  other enterprises for  investment  in  plant and  equipment  and  a  smaller 
percentage  for  credit to handicraft as  secondary  reserves.  The  excess 
of  these  requirements  over  the  credit is either invested  in  Treasury  bills 
(with  the  approval  of the  Bank  of Greece)  or is deposited  with  the  Bank 
of  Greece  in  an  interest-bearing account. - 5  -
This  is a discursive elaboration  of  the  nature  of the  arrangements 
on  reserve  requirements.  This 
111  iberated
11  re_quired  reserve  system  which 
was  introduced  in  1966  and  subsequently modified  in  1972  has  been  charac-
terized  by  the  authorities as·capable  of meeting  the  needs  of  the 
Greek  economy.  We  will  then  proceed  with  an  analytical  formulation  and 
evaluation of  the  system  4. 
3:  THE  ANALYTIC  FORt\1ULATION  OF  RESERVE  REQUIRH1ENTS 
3.1.  The  structure of primary  reserves  5 
Total  required  reserves  (RR)  consist of  primary-required  reserves 
(RR1)  and  secondary-required  reserves  (RR2).  That  is 
(1)  RR  =  RR1  +  RR2 
We  have  seen  above  that banks  are  required  to  hold  non-interest 
bearing  reserves  with  the  central  bank  against certain types  of bank 
credit.  On  the  other  hand,  banks  are  allowed  to withdraw  from  the  central 
bank  part of their reserves  to  cover  credit to  trades  of  the  private 
sector which  are  specified  by  the monetary  authorities.  Also,  banks  hold 
reserves  against  their private deposit  liabilities (Q).  Thus,  the 
aggregate  level  of primary  reserves  is given  by 
(2) 
2 
E  r.  L. 
i=l  1  1 
4on  the  banks•  responsibility and  role to meet  the  needs  of the  Greek 
economy,  see  Zolotas  (1965). 
5A reform  which  avoids  only  the  breakdown  of  banks•  total  private deposits 
to satisfy reserve  requirements  and  introduces ·deposits  in  foreign 
exchange  for  this purpose  was  introduced  in  1977.  Neither  affects the 
arguments  of our  analysis. where 
Ll  = 
L2  = 
L3  = 
L4  = 
L5  = 
r.  = 
1 
rl  = 
- 6 -
short-term credit to  industry 
short-term credit to domestic  and  import  trades 
credit to export  and  tobacco  trades  and  shipbuilding 
medium  and  long-term  credit for  investment  in  plant and 
equipment 
credit to  public enterprises 
statutory reserve  ratios applied  to  : 
short-term credit to  industry as  non-interest-bearing 
primary  reserves 
r2  =  short-term credit to  domestic  and  import  trades  as  non-inte-
rest-bearing primary  reserves 
r3  =  credit to export  and  tobacco  trades  and  shipbuilding as 
non-interest-bearing  primary  reserves 
r4  =  medium  and  long-term  credit for  investment  in  plant and 
equipment  as  non-interest-bearing  primary  reserves 
r5  =  credit to  public enterprises as  non-interest-bearing 
primary  reserves 
r6,  r7,  r8  = private  savings  (S)  and  private  demand  (D)  and 
restricted  (Bl)  deposits  respectively as  non-interest-
bearing  primary  reserves  since  1972 
rg,  riO  = private  savings  and  private demand  deposits  respectively 
as  interest-bearing seasonal  primary  reserves 
r11 ,  r12 ,  r13,  r14  =private savings  (excluding  savings  deposits 
on  3-month  notice),  private  time  (T)  and  private demand 
and  restricted deposits  respectively as  interest-bearing 
primary  reserves  since  1972 
ox  =  dummy  for seasonal  reserves 
The  reserves  ratios  ri  applied  to  primary  reserves  (RR1)  are 
given  in  the  upper  part of Table  1. - 7  -
TABLE  1 
Legal  Reserve  Requirements  since  1966 
Non-interest-bearing 
Credit  to 




rl  r2 
*  Si nee  1972 
**  Since  1971 
PRIMARY  = RR1 
reserves  Interest-bearing 
De- Sea- De-
po- son- po-
sits*  al  sits* 
r6  oxr9  r11, 
r7  6xr10  r13 
r8  r14 
SECONDARY  = RR2 
reserves 
r12 
The  term  with  negative  sign  in  equation  (2)  corresponds  to  re-
serves  that banks  are  allowed  to withdraw  from  the  central  bank  for  the 
corresponding  types  of credit. 
3.2.  The  structure of secondary  reserves 
In  terms  of  secondary  reserves  (RR2), banks  are  required  to  in-
vest a  percentage  (r15)  of their private demand,  savings  and  restricted 
deposits  as  well  as  a  percentage  (r16)  of their time  and  3-month  notice - 8  -
savings  deposits  (S1)  in  interest-bearing Treasury  bills.  They  are  also 
required  to  extend  medium  and  long-term  loans  to  industry and  other enter-
prises for  investment  in  plants and  equipment  (Lf)  equal  to  a  percentage 
(rf)  of their total  private deposits  (Q).  The  excess  of the  requirement 
over  the  credit is either invested  in  Treasury  bills  (proportion  j 1)  or  is 
deposited  with  the  central  bank  in  an  interest-bearing account  (proportion 
l-j1).  In  addition,  banks  are  required  to  extend  loans  to  handicraft  (Lf) 
equal  to  a  percentage  (rh)  applied  to  the  increment  of their total  private 
deposits  (Q-Q
0
)  ;  where  Q
0  are deposits  as  of January  1,  1966.  Again  the 
excess  of  the  requirement  over  the  credit is either invested  in  Treasury 
bills  (proportion  j 2)  or is deposited with  the  central  bank  in  an  interest-
bearing  account  (proportion  1-j2).  The  proportions  j1  and  j2 
are  determined  by  the  monetary  authorities. 
The  reserve  ratios ri  applied  to  secondary-reserves  (RR2)  are 
given  in  the  lower  part of Table  1 where 
(3) 
r15  =  private  demand,  savings  and  restricted deposits  on  interest-
bearing  Treasury  bills as  secondary  reserves  since  1972 
r16  =  private  time  and  3-month  notice  savings  deposits  on 
interest-bearing Treasury  bills as  secondary  reserves 
since  1971 
rf  =  total  private deposits  (Q)  for medium  and  long-term  credit 
to  industry and  other enterprises for  investment  in  plant 
and  equipment  as  secondary  reserves 
rh  =  total  private deposits  (Q-Q
0
)  for  long-term  credit to 
handicraft as  secondary  reserves  (Q
0  = value  of Q as 
of January  1,  1966). 
Lf  =  medium  and  long-term  credit to  industry and  other enter-
prises withdrawn  from  banks'  secondary  reserves. 
Lh  =  credit to  handicraft withdrawn  from  banks'  secondary 
reserves. 
Thus,  the  stock  of government  securities  held  by  banks  is - 9  -
and 
(4)  sB 
r  =  r15  (D  + S +  B1)  + r16  (T  + s1) 
+  j1  (rfQ  - Lf) 
+  j2  (rh(Q  - Qo)  - Lh) 
where 
sB  =  statutory component  of  SB  r 
sB  =  non-statutory component  of  sB 
0 
On  the  other hand,  the  stock  of  banks'  interest-bearing deposits 
with  the  central  bank  is 
(5) 
and 
(6)  D~  =  (1  - j1)  (rf Q - Lf)  +  (1  - j2)  (rh  (Q  - Q
0
)  - Lh) 
where 
DB  =  banks'  interest-bearing deposits with  the  central  bank 
DB  =  statutory component  of  DB  r 
DB  =  non-statutory component  of  DB 
0 
Hence,  the  secondary  reserves  are  given  by 
(7)  RR  - DB  +  SB  2  - r  r 
or - 10  -
via equations  (4)  and  (6). 
Diagram  1 below  simplifies the  structure of  RR1  and  RR2 as  des-
cribed  by  equations  (2)  and  (7a)  respectively.  Banks'  private  total 
deposits  (Q)  are  distributed over  required  reserves  (RR)  and  credit  (L). 
The  ordinary funds  between  deposits  and  credits are denoted  by  the  broken 
lines;  the  statutory flows,  i.e., the  legal  requirements,  are  denoted  by 
solid lines.  The  upper  part of  thedia~ram  seems  to  indicate  that the 
primary  objective of  RR1 is  to properly  channel  banks'  credit from  sectors 
L1  ,  L2 to sectors L 3  ,  L4  ,  L5.  The  RR2 are  intended  to  induce  banks 




•  The  structure of  RR2 and  hence  expression  (7a)  is 
evaluated  below  6. 
DIAGRAM  1  The  Structure of Legal  Reserve  Requirements 
6For  the  importance  of the  distribution of bank  credit for economic 
development  in  Greece,  see  also,  Paoandreou  (1962,  p.  104);  Coutsoumaris 
(1963,pp.  195-196);  Ellis et al  (1964,  pp.  50-54);  Pesmazoglu  (1965, 
pp.  20-21)  0 - 11  -
4.  AN  EVALUATION  OF  THE  EXISTING  STRUCTURE  OF  RESERVE  REQUIREMENTS 
4.1.  An  evaluation of  the  structure of  secondary  reserves 
The  analytic  formulation  of  seconda.ry  reserves  reveals  that, if 
banks  extend  the  long-term  credit to  industry  and  other enterprises  (Lf) 
as  well  as  to handicraft  (Lh),  then  the  term  (rhQo  + Lf  + Lh)  in  (7a)  holds. 
However,  banks  might  avoid  extending  credit sufficiently, and  deposit  a 
percentage  of  their required  reserves  with  the  central  bank,  thus  profiting 
from  the  interest-bearing deposits  as  expressed  by  (rf + rh)Q  in  (7a). 
Why  might  banks  choose  so?  It might  be  that the monetary  authori-
ties•  credit policy 
11allows
11  them  sometimes  to  use  their interest-bearing 
(rf +  rh)Q  more  profitably than  what  the  credit  in  Lf  and  Lh  yields.  That 
is, banks  are  occasionally allowed  to  invest in  Treasury  bills  S~  their 
interest-bearing deposits  with  the  central  bank.  Obviously,  banks  may  very 
well  deposit  a  proportion  of their requirement  for  Lf  and  Lh  and  then 
switch  into the  higher  yield  bearing  S~  rather than  make  loans  to the  two 
sectors Lf  and  lh.  At  the  same  time,  they  might  extend  high  yielding 
short-term  cr·ect it to  Lh  and  Lf  from  their free  reserves. 
The  underlined  weakness  of  RR2 may  not  be  so  serious  since  banks• 
investment  of rfQ  + rh  (Q  - Q
0
)  in  Treasury  bills is at the  monetary  autho-
rities•  discretion.  Nonetheless,  in  practice,  the  authorities allow  banks 
to  do  so,  which  then  invalidates  the  term  (rhQo  +  Lf  +  Lh)  thus  confirming 
the  underlined  weakness  of  RR2. 
Thus,  given  the  current structure of policy,  the  monetary  authori-
ties•  action  could  very  easily subvert  the  intent of  that policy 7. 
4.2.  The  complexi~y of  required  reserves 
To  see  the  complexity  of the  existing system  of  reserve  require-
ments,  the expression  for  RR  is  rewritten  via  (2)  and  (7a)  as 
7Hence,  selective  bank  credit policies designed  to  promote  the  stabili-
zation  and  economic  deve 1  opment  objectives  of the  country  mi·ght  produce 
perverse effects. - 12  -
where 
8  1  =  rf  +  rh 
82  =  r7  +  r13  + r15  +  8xr10 
0  3  =  r12  +  r16 
e  =  r6  +  rll  + rl5  +  oxr9  4 
8  =  r8  +  r14  + r15  5 
2  5 
0  =  E  +  r.L. - E  r.  L.  - rh  Qo  6  i=1 
1  1  i=3 
1  1 
The  parameters  01,  02,  03,  04,  05  ,  and  r16  represent the  avera9e  reserve 
requirements  for  a  combination  of  banks•  private deposits.  In  this respect, 
they  reflect the  complexity  of the  existing system  of required  reserves. 
To  further analyze  this complexity,  let us  utilize the  behavioral 
ratios describing  the  distribution  (allocation)  of banks•  private deposits 
affecting  RR. 
Let 
x = D/Q  = demand-banks•  total  private deposits  ratio 
t  = T/Q  = time-banks•  total  private deposits  ratio 
s  = S/Q  = savings-banks•  total  private deposits  ratio 
s1= S1/Q=  3-month  notice savings-banks•  total  private 
deposits  ratio. 
o = Bl/0=  restricted-banks•  total  private deposits  ratio. 
Substituting  these  ratios  into  (la)  we  have 
(1b) 
where 
RR  = 0nQ  +  8 6 - 13  -
= vector  of  reserve  requirements 
n  ~  (  1  x  t  s  o  s1  )  ' 
= vector  of  banks'  deposits  distribution 
en  = is a  scalar equal  to 
Expressions  (lb)  and  (en)  suggest  that  RR  are  affected  by  changes  in 
banks'  total  private deposits  Q,  changes  in  the  distribution of q (vector 
n)  ,  and  changes  in  the  statutory requirements  (vector e). 
Vectors  e and  n are then  important  constraints  influencing  RR.  Any 
change,  however,  in  RR  also  influences  banks'  desired  quantity for  base 
money  or total-reserves  R 8•  Let  us  then  look  closer to  see  how  RR,  and 
thus  R,  are affected  by  changes  in  banks'  deposits  distribution and 
changes  in  their statutory requirements. 
Defining  the  required  reserves  ratio as 
(8)  rr = RR/Q 
and  substituting  {lb)  into it, we  have 
where 
Expression  (8)  indicates  that the  required  reserves  ratio depends  on  the 
statutory requirements  (vector e)  ,  on  the distribution of banks'  deposits 
(vector  n)  ,  and  on  the  term  e7 which  was  previously  defined. 
8The  reserve  requirements,  being  on  an  average  basis over  a monthly  period, 
introduce  stochastic weiahts  on  the  known  values  of the  reserve  ratios 
and  thus  make  it impossible  to  determine  the  direction of  the  change  in 
elements  of vector  n and  especially t  and  s  except  by  forecasting  the 
values  of the  stochastic weights.  This  introduces  some  uncertainty in  the 
monetary  authorities'  ability to  effectively predict changes  in  the  banks' 
holdings  of base  money  and  reserves  requirements. - 14  -
Then  the  relative effects of changes  in  the  statutory and  en do-
geneous  variables  on  r  in  terms  of elasticities are  r 
e1 
E  (rr, e1)  = 
rr 
e2x 
E  (rr' e2)  = 
rr 
e3t 
E  (rr' e3)  = 
rr 
e4s 
E  (rr' e4)  = 
rr 
e  o  5 
E  (rr' e5)  = 
rr 
r16s1 
E  (rr,  r16)  = 
rr 
Our  analysis  demonstrates  that the  existing legislation  pertaining 
to  reserve  requirements  is very  complex.  It was  a  welcome  development  that 
the nonetary authorities  introduced,  in  January  1977,  a  reform  which 
somewhat  alleviated the  complexity  of the  required  reserves  system.  Never-
theless,  radical  simplifications are still  needed. 
5.  SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
The  objective of  this  paper  has  been  to  provide  qualitative evi-
dence  concerning  the  effectiveness of  the  existing structure of the  legal 
reserve  requirements  of  the  Greek  economy.  By  first incorporating  into  an 
operating  framework  the  relevant  institutional  arrangements  that condition 
the  behavior  of the monetary  authorities and  the  banks,  it was  found  that 
the  existing system  of required  reserves  is very  complex.  Specifically, 
the  structure of controls maintained  by  the  monetary  authorities on  banks• 
liabilities and  assets, the  maintained  categories of reserve  requirements 
and  the mechanism  of allowing  banks  to  withdraw  from  the  central  bank  part - 15  -
of  their reserves  to cover credit to different sectors of the  economy, 
produce  such  a  complex  system  of  required  reserves that it makes  it 
more  difficult for  the  central  bank  to  keep  full  control  over  the 
aggregate  volume  and  direction of bank  credit. 
In  addition,  the  existing  legislation pertaining  to  reserve 
requirements,  and  ~articularly that concerning  the  secondary  reserves  RR2, 
displays obvious  disadvantages.  It was  shown,  contrary to  the  objectives 
of the  Greek  monetary  authorities,  that  :  banks  may  very  well  switch 
the  primary  objective of  RR2  ;  banks  can  offset almost  all  the  remaining 
power  of  RR2 through  other means  of  borrowing;  and  the  reallocation of 
credit to  sectors of  "national  priority" may  not  be  best accomplished 
through  the  RR2 policy.  By  implication,  this finding  also  suggests  that 
the  existing structure of  RR2 is accompanied  by  negative allocative 
effects  in  bank  credit,  regulates credit inefficiently,  introduces  un-
certainty in  the  implementation  of monetary  policy,  and  gives  rise to 
losses of economic  welfare. 
The  central  bank  has  recognized  the  problems  posed  by  the  un-
wieldy  system  of required  reserves,  and  has  on  several  occasions  announced 
its intention of  reforming  it. This  paper  concludes  that such  reforms 
would  be  highly desirable. - 16  -
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